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ABSTRACT 
 
The Moroccan administration is showing increasing interest in designing policies to tackle 
groundwater overuse. In particular, it aims to set up aquifer management contracts for the main 
overused aquifers, which should bring together broad coalitions of actors around coordinated 
supply and demand policies. This article analyses to what extent the actors involved in 
groundwater use and management come together for the definition and implementation of 
policies to deal with groundwater overuse in four regions. A broad coalition has been built 
around the design of an aquifer management contract only in the Souss. Catchment management 
agencies and the Ministry of the Interior collaborate to control the drilling of boreholes in the 
Saiss, Souss and Berrchid regions. Large-scale farmers in the Souss support the Ministry of 
Agriculture in developing more water resources. Small-scale farmers were involved in none of 
these coalitions. The depth of the aquifer, the importance of the groundwater economy in each 
region, and the motivation and capacities of actors help explain the diversity in the coalitions 
that were created. While such elements help define the specific needs to support coalition 
building in each case, in all cases, particular human resources and skills will be needed to 
catalyse such coalitions, as will innovative ways to include small-scale farmers. 
 
KEY WORDS: coalition; demand management; groundwater; Morocco; policy 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
RÉSUMÉ 
 
Le gouvernement marocain montre un intérêt croissant pour concevoir des politiques permettant 
de faire face à la surexploitation des aquifères. Il cherche en particulier à concevoir des contrats 
de nappe pour les principaux aquifères surexploités. Ces contrats devraient rassembler de larges 
coalitions d’acteurs autour de politiques coordonnées portant sur l’offre et la demande en eau. 
L’article analyse dans quelle mesure les acteurs impliqués dans l’usage et la gestion des 
ressources en eau s’associent pour concevoir et mettre en œuvre des politiques pour faire face à 
la surexploitation des aquifères dans quatre régions. Une coalition a été construite autour de la 
conception d’un contrat de nappe seulement dans la région du Souss. Les agences de l’eau et le 
Ministère de l’Intérieur collaborent pour le contrôle des forages dans les régions du Saiss, du 
Souss et de Berrchid. Les agriculteurs de grandes exploitations dans le Souss appuient le 
Ministère de l’Agriculture pour la mobilisation de nouvelles ressources en eau. Les agriculteurs 
de petites exploitations ne sont présents dans aucune de ces coalitions. La profondeur de 
l’aquifère, l’importance de l’économie liée à l’usage agricole des aquifères, et la motivation et 
les capacités des acteurs contribuent à expliquer la diversité des coalitions qui ont été créées. 
Ces derniers éléments permettent de définir les besoins pour appuyer la conception de coalitions 
dans chaque cas. Cela dit, dans tous les cas, des ressources humaines et des compétences 
spécifiques seront nécessaires pour catalyser ces coalitions, de même qu’il faudra identifier des 
méthodes innovantes pour inclure les agriculteurs de petites exploitations. 
 
MOTS CLES: coalition, gestion de la demande, eau souterraine, politique, Maroc 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In Morocco, achieving sustainable use of groundwater has become one of the most pressing 
issues in water resource management as many of the major aquifers of the country are already 
overexploited (Moroccan Secretariat in Charge of Water and Environment, 2007). After decades 
of relative absence of the State in dealing with groundwater overexploitation, the administration 
is now showing increasing willingness to address this issue. New policies are being 
implemented that consider both supply and demand management. The Moroccan Secretariat in 
Charge of Water and Environment also perceives the need to form large coalitions of actors 
around a set of coordinated policies in large-scale overused aquifers. For that reason, it has 
asked the Catchment Management Agencies (CMA), who are in charge of water resource 
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management, to set up aquifer management contracts in ten large-scale overexploited aquifers. 
These contracts are intended to involve all major stakeholders. 
The perceived need for coalition building corresponds to calls for considering the water 
sector as a complex system, where actions undertaken by a single actor are unlikely to have 
much effect on the sustainable use of water resources (Mollinga et al., 2007). Coalitions, which 
can be defined as groups of actors who coordinate their activities in order to achieve shared 
policy goals (Schlager, 1995), are increasingly seen as the key not only to ensuring the 
implementation of policies, but also in the policy choices made. 
This is especially the case of groundwater use, as the goals and degrees of 
implementation of policies to control overexploitation are particularly sensitive to the type of 
coalitions formed. Indeed, there is a general lack of successful experience and blueprints to 
tackle groundwater overexploitation, especially in developing countries (Shah et al., 2007). As a 
result, there is no clearly-defined process to enable a shift from a situation of open access to one 
of sustainable use that would allow focusing on the creation of an appropriate coalition to 
ensure its successful implementation. Like surface water, the composition of the coalitions 
formed will influence the relative importance given to supply and demand management. 
Concerning the management of demand, coalitions may attempt to apply direct management of 
groundwater uses. For instance, in India, upper caste farmers in Rajasthan agreed to the state-led 
policy to control groundwater use and deliver tradable rights, because they hoped that such a 
reform would prevent lower caste farmers from having access to groundwater (Birkenholtz, 
2009). Coalitions of actors may also favour more indirect approaches. Also in India, the 
government of Gujarat set up a dedicated electrical network for irrigation pumps, which made it 
possible to control the volume of water pumped and obtained the approval of the farmers as the 
energy supply became more reliable (Shah, 2009). However, the coalitions that are formed may 
not suffice to implement policies: the control of groundwater use that was planned to be 
implemented by groundwater user associations in Mexico was unsuccessful due to lack of 
support from both farmers and public organisations at federal level (Wester et al., 2011). 
Coalitions may also oppose policies to control groundwater overdraft. In several states in India, 
farmers lobbied against attempts to stop the supply of free electricity for groundwater pumping 
systems, even though this policy had repeatedly been identified as a major cause of groundwater 
overuse (Mukherji, 2006).  
A wide range of policies and supporting coalitions thus exist that address groundwater 
overuse, both between and within countries (Mukherji and Shah, 2005; Shah, 2009). Several 
authors attempted to explain this diversity by comparative studies using different analytical 
frameworks (Faysse and Petit, 2012). Analyzing the attributes of users (as initially developed by 
4 
 
Ostrom, 2000) and the behaviour of higher-level authorities made it possible to understand the 
differences observed in Spanish groundwater user associations (Lopez-Gunn and Martinez-
Cortina, 2006). Mukherji (2006) showed that the difference in the strength of farmers’ 
organisations and the local political setting helped explain why strict demand management 
measures were implemented in groundwater abundant West Bengal, while policies to curb the 
use of fragile aquifers in Gujarat were limited. In the same way, because of farmers’ different 
incentives for implementing groundwater recharge, hard rock aquifers that are generally 
considered to be vulnerable may actually prove to be more appropriate for sustainable 
groundwater use than large-scale alluvial aquifers in India (Shah, 2012). 
Policies to address groundwater overexploitation in Morocco share constraints commonly 
found in developing countries, such as the limited means of public organisations in charge of 
groundwater resources and the high number of informal water users. The proposed goal to build 
coalitions gathering all stakeholders through aquifer management contracts is more original, 
since this approach is usually used in developed countries (Petit, 2009). This article analyses to 
what extent the actors involved in groundwater use and regulation come together around the 
definition and implementation of policies to deal with groundwater overuse in four Moroccan 
regions and provides some explanations for the differences in the involvement of actors and in 
the constitution of coalitions. These explanations may help reflect on how to support the 
creation of coalitions able to define and implement policies for sustainable agricultural use of 
groundwater, and which also take into account the diversity of existing types of agriculture. 
 
METHOD  
 
The analysis was based on four study areas: the Souss-Chtouka, Saiss, Berrchid and coastal 
Chaouia aquifers (see Figure 1 and Table I for basic data). Interviews with public organisations 
were conducted in all four study areas, in particular with the CMAs and the local offices of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Marine Fishery (hereafter referred to as MoA). Surveys of 40 farms 
were undertaken in the Souss and Saiss regions. Both interviews and surveys investigated: i) 
actors’ assessment of the current state of groundwater resources and, if they were aware of a 
drop in the groundwater table, the reasons for this; ii) actors’ understanding of and support for 
existing public policies to deal with groundwater overdraft, and possible involvement in their 
implementation; iii) actors’ own proposals on how to achieve sustainable use of groundwater. 
These surveys were complemented by similar work with 155 farmers in Berrchid (Errahj et al., 
2010) and 39 farmers in the coastal Chaouia (Berrahmani et al., submitted). Although several of 
the study areas also face problems of groundwater pollution, our analysis was limited to 
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quantitative aspects. In addition, groundwater is also used for drinking water and industry in our 
study areas, but only agricultural use was analysed here, since agriculture is by far the largest 
groundwater user (e.g., 95% in Souss).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The aquifers studied in Morocco. 
 
Table I. Basic data concerning the study areas. 
 Souss-
Chtouka 
Saiss Berrchid Coastal 
Chaouia 
Total area (km
2
) 5,090 2,200 1,500 1,200 
Average irrigated area using groundwater (ha) 122,100 38,000 18,000 * 
Number of wells and boreholes 20,000 8,000 1,700 * 
Maximum depth of the aquifer (m) 500 1,500 150 120 
Average decrease in the groundwater table in the 
area of maximum decrease (m/yr) 
2.5 3 0.5 0.5 
Average deficit (million m
3
)  286 100 19 10 
Average groundwater withdrawal /average 
recharge (%) 
180% 141% 140% 130% 
Source: interviews and CMA technical documents.* no recent data. 
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RESULTS 
 
Next we describe the policies that were planned and implemented to deal with groundwater 
overdraft in the four study areas, and then we describe the position of the main actors with 
regard to these policies, and the coalitions formed around these policies.  
 
Policies specific to each area 
 
The coastal Chaouia aquifer. In this area, groundwater overuse since the 1970s led to 
seawater intrusion in littoral land and decreasing groundwater levels further inland. Farmers had 
to adapt by changing cropping systems, by bringing fresh water to their farms, deepening 
boreholes or relocating to other regions. Groundwater stress was the main cause of the change in 
the region from intensive export-oriented agriculture to agricultural crisis. The Oum Er-Rbia 
CMA is responsible for the management of the western part of the aquifer and the Bouregreg-
Chaouia CMA for the east. In practice, the CMAs only monitor piezometric levels and salinity 
rates. One reason is that, for both agencies, this aquifer is not of major importance compared to 
other larger aquifers and surface water issues. Thus the drilling and use of boreholes remains 
uncontrolled. Although around 90% of irrigation consists of drip irrigation (generally installed 
informally, without public subsidies), the groundwater balance still shows a deficit. In the 
1990s, the local MoA office planned to set up a 2,500 ha irrigation scheme using water from the 
neighbouring Oum Er-Rbia River. In 2011, the project had not yet been implemented due to: i) 
lack of funding; ii) the absence of strong local farmers’ organisations; iii) doubts over the 
availability of sufficient surface water and subsequent lack of support of the Oum Er-Rbia 
CMA.  
The Berrchid aquifer. The shallow Berrchid aquifer is the main groundwater resource in 
the area under the responsibility of the Bouregreg-Chaouia CMA. According to this CMA, the 
overall water volume stocked in the aquifer decreased from 1,500 million m
3
 in 1980 to 800 
million m
3
 in 2009. Water is fully depleted at the outskirts of the aquifer so farmers located in 
these areas have attempted to move to the centre of the aquifer where water is still available. 
According to the survey, 52% of cropped area was farmed by tenants. Until 2010, most actions 
undertaken by the Bouregreg-Chaouia CMA focused on the supply side, with the construction 
of small weirs in river beds to increase groundwater recharge and of an irrigation scheme using 
treated waste water from the town of Berrchid. In 2011, the CMA held meetings to involve local 
public organisations, such as the local offices of the Ministry of the Interior and judiciary 
institutions, in the control of borehole drilling. This active stance resulted in the first seizure of a 
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drilling machine in March 2011. The CMA planned to draw up an aquifer management contract, 
but had not yet started at the time of writing.  
The Saiss aquifer. This aquifer comprises a superficial layer and a deep layer, although 
there are many hydraulic connections between the two layers. The decrease in the groundwater 
table in some parts of the deep layer was the fastest in the whole country, with an average rate 
of decrease of 3 m/yr. The Sebou CMA decided to stop delivering authorisations for new 
boreholes, except for farms of less than 5 ha, for which authorisations are still delivered. The 
CMA started to control the drilling of boreholes and seized some drilling machines that were 
operating illegally. Despite this action, the MoA gave the concession of 7,250 ha formerly 
managed by two parastatals to private investors. It approved the investment plans of these 
investors including drilling boreholes for irrigation, for which the CMA eventually delivered 
authorisation. One reason behind the stance of the MoA is the planned transfer of water from 
the Mdez dam (under construction in 2011) that should supply 120 million m
3
, which is more 
than the groundwater deficit calculated by the Sebou CMA. While water levels have been 
declining, only a small percentage of small-scale farmers were limited in their production as 
they lacked investment capacities to pursue falling groundwater levels. In 2011, the CMA hired 
a consultancy firm to prepare the aquifer management contract and have it signed by 
stakeholders. 
The Souss and Chtouka aquifers. Here the neighbouring Souss and Chtouka aquifers are 
considered jointly, as is the case in most public policies, and the study area is hereafter referred 
to as the Souss region. These aquifers were the first in Morocco where the fall in the 
groundwater table became a subject of public concern (Popp, 1983). In 2004, the Souss-Massa 
Regional Council undertook a study to define a regional development strategy. This study 
ranked agriculture as a key component of the regional economy, with groundwater overdraft as 
its main Achilles heel. Indeed, in the El Guerdane area, groundwater overexploitation led to 
abandonment of the cultivation of 11,900 ha until a pipe was laid to bring water from an 
upstream dam. This project involved public subsidies and was the result of the active lobbying 
of large-scale farmers in the area concerned (Houdret, 2008). In 2005, the local CMA launched 
an initiative to control the drilling of boreholes and, in 2006, had stopped the drilling of 70 
boreholes. In the same year, under the leadership of the Regional Council, a framework 
convention was negotiated and signed by the CMA, the Regional Council, the local offices of 
the MoA, the local Chamber of Agriculture, the regional federation of water user associations 
and three farmers’ organisations involved in marketing citrus fruits and vegetables. 
This convention outlined several actions to address the groundwater crisis. It had four 
components: 1) a decrease in water consumption and an increase in water productivity, mainly 
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achieved by shifting from surface and sprinkler irrigation to drip irrigation and establishing a 
‘water police’ force to control the drilling of boreholes; 2) more efficient irrigation practices and 
reuse of treated waste water; 3) use of deep groundwater resources; and 4) building of several 
small and medium-size dams. The funding required for these actions was estimated at around 
3.5 million Euros per year and was to be provided by farmers who owned more than 15 ha. This 
category of farmers represents 20% of farms and 80% of pumped groundwater. After the 
signing of the convention, the coordination of its implementation was handed over to the Souss-
Massa CMA. 
The Souss-Massa CMA defined three scenarios and in particular a positive one of 
‘governance’ where groundwater overdraft would be almost completely stopped by 2020. 
However, this prospective exercise did not lead to a shared vision among stakeholders regarding 
the desirable forms of agriculture and territorial development in the future. As a result, the 
framework convention focused on the process of reducing overexploitation, without clearly 
explaining the expected end results of such actions. 
Coordination between the Souss-Massa CMA and the local offices of the MoA and of the 
Ministry of the Interior permitted the seizure of borehole drilling machines that operated 
illegally. Those in charge of control often intervened after having been informed either by 
neighbouring farmers or local authorities that an illegal borehole was being drilled. From 2006 
to 2009, 120 drilling machines were seized. In 2010, no drilling machine was seized, which was 
considered by the CMA as a sign that illegal borehole drilling had been drastically reduced. 
However, borehole drilling continued in 2011 due to understaffing of the water police and, 
according to many farmers interviewed, because some farmers managed to obtain the informal 
consent of the staff of either the CMA or the Ministry of the Interior. Moreover, farmers are 
allowed to replace a dried up borehole by a deeper one. Other actions undertaken in the frame of 
the convention were changing all existing surface irrigation systems to drip irrigation, and the 
planned creation of a 10,000 ha irrigation scheme using desalinized water in the Chtouka area, 
which, according to plans discussed in 2011, would profit from public subsidies. 
 
Policies common to the cases 
 
The MoA provides farmers with subsidies to change from surface to drip irrigation. These 
subsidies cover between 90 and 100% of the total cost (with a funding limit for each component 
of the irrigation system). There is a wide consensus among public actors that this policy is an 
appropriate way to limit groundwater use and ‘save’ water. However, many studies have shown 
that farmers who use groundwater and who change from surface to drip irrigation often do not 
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reduce their groundwater withdrawal (Pfeiffer and Lin, 2011), and that the change has limited 
impacts on the water balance at catchment or aquifer basin level (Ward and Pulido-Velazquez, 
2008). 
The CMAs of the Berrchid, Saiss and Souss regions use a similar method to attempt to 
control groundwater use. First, a survey is undertaken to count existing wells and boreholes. 
The farmers are then asked to come to the CMA to register their existing wells and boreholes. In 
2011 this procedure was underway in the Souss, Saiss and Berrchid. The situation was 
scheduled to be ‘frozen’ by February 2012, and, from then on, the CMAS planned that all 
unregistered boreholes subsequently discovered would be closed down. Farmers who registered 
their boreholes may then be asked to pay a specific tax for water consumption. This method 
faces two main difficulties. First, only a few farmers have come forward. In the Souss, only 
farmers who wanted to legally drill a borehole (for instance because they owned one that had 
dried out) or to obtain subsidies for shifting to drip irrigation (for which formal registration of 
the borehole is required) accepted to follow this formal procedure. In 2010, legalised boreholes 
amounted to an irrigated area of 5,000 ha in the Souss. The second difficulty is obliging farmers 
to pay the planned groundwater use tax. In 2010, a nationwide decree was enacted that enables 
the CMAs to take legal action against farmers who do not pay.  
 
Actors’ positions 
 
Efforts by CMAs and by the Souss-Massa Regional Council to enrol actors. In all three 
study areas, the CMAs have a limited presence in the field and a limited capacity to monitor 
groundwater use. For that reason, they need support from other public organisations to be able 
to control groundwater use. The Souss-Massa Regional Council succeeded in building a 
coalition of public organisations both to coordinate groundwater management policies and to 
launch the water police force. In the same way, the CMAs in the Saiss and Berrchid areas were 
able to involve the local offices of the Ministry of the Interior, which became the CMA ‘organ’ 
for the implementation of the activities of the water police. 
In the Saiss, the Sebou CMA was unable to obtain the support of other public 
organisations. This was particularly the case of the MoA, which supported further agricultural 
development. The MoA did not consider the situation to be critical, especially because of the 
expected transfer of water from the Mdez dam. The Sebou CMA took up the challenge and put 
forward a discourse of ‘groundwater crisis’. While in the north-eastern part of the aquifer, the 
groundwater table is still at the same level as it was years ago, in its policy documents, the 
Sebou CMA systematically includes a graph of changes in the groundwater table in the area 
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with the fastest decrease in the whole aquifer. 
Using Gramsci’s perspective (1971), the CMAs can be considered as simultaneously 
attempting to coerce the farmers and to obtain their consent for their policies. The CMAs’ 
efforts to stop illegal drilling increased their power in their relation with the farmers. Indeed, 
after the first seizing of drilling machines in the Souss, farmers’ organisations no longer 
considered that it was safer for them to remain outside the process of defining management 
policies. The CMAs also considered the aquifer management contracts as a tool to obtain the 
farmers’ approval for the regulation of groundwater use. 
Limited MoA and farmers’ involvement. Apart from in the Souss, local MoA offices were 
not involved in the control of borehole drilling. The Souss MoA office manages irrigation 
schemes and has experience in dealing with water provision. In the three other areas, the local 
MoA offices do not manage water resources for irrigation and consider that groundwater 
resources are outside their mandate. 
Farmers’ organisations in the Souss who signed the convention either represent only a 
minority of large-scale farmers (the case of horticulture exporting associations) or have weak 
links with grassroots farmers (the case of the Chamber of Agriculture and the federation of 
water user associations). They do not represent all farmers; not even all farmers who own more 
than 15 ha. By contrast, a major dairy and citrus cooperative has 14,000 dairy farmer members 
and has strong links with them, but was not invited to sign the convention. In the three other 
areas, farmers’ organisations are much weaker than in the Souss, and, in practice, have had very 
limited interactions with the CMAs. 
Interviews with farmers revealed a wide range of assessments of the situation of 
groundwater resources and of possible actions to address their overexploitation. Farmers in the 
Souss, Saiss and Berrchid regions were generally aware of the links between intensive use of 
groundwater for irrigation and the drop in the water table (a result also found by Bekkar et al., 
2009). By contrast, many farmers in the coastal Chaouia area did not think that groundwater 
overuse was the main reason for seawater intrusion (Bento et al., 2009). Most farmers 
considered that the implementation of regulatory tools was above all the responsibility of the 
State (see also Bekkar et al., 2009). Among the different options they proposed for sustainable 
groundwater use, only 9% of Berrchid farmers and no Chaouia farmer mentioned actions to 
control groundwater use, such as limiting the drilling of boreholes or installing water meters. By 
contrast, approximately half the farmers in Souss and Saiss mentioned at least one action to 
control groundwater use. Moreover, half the farmers interviewed in the Souss said that farmers 
helped the police stop illegal borehole drilling and agreed to the installation of water meters. 
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Restricted and fragile coalitions 
 
The coalitions considered here are limited to actors who are actively involved in the 
design and implementation of policies. Indeed, all actors agree about the usefulness of public 
subsidies to enable a shift to drip irrigation, but in practice only the MoA is involved in the 
implementation of this policy. The only large coalition is the one that was built during the 
design of the framework convention in the Souss, but large-scale farmers’ involvement in this 
coalition was fragile, as they were critical of its limited effects in supporting agriculture. Two 
other more restricted coalitions exist concerning the development of the water resource and the 
regulation of groundwater use (Table II). In the Souss, large-scale farmers formed an alliance 
with the MoA to obtain state support for new resources, both for the pipeline bringing water to 
the El Guerdane sector and for the planned irrigated scheme using desalinized water in the 
Chtouka region. In the Saiss and Berrchid areas, farmers were much less actively engaged in 
supporting the mobilisation of new water resources. Coalition building for borehole drilling 
between the CMA and the Ministry of the Interior appeared to be particularly important for its 
implementation. Indeed, compared to India (Shah, 2009), the control of borehole drilling (with a 
focus on the activities of drilling machines rather than on existing wells and boreholes) is not so 
much an economic issue, but rather of involving the Ministry of the Interior, due to the large 
presence of agents of this ministry in rural areas. In none of the cases were small-scale farmers 
part of a coalition. 
 
 
Table II. Coalitions around policies to deal with groundwater overdraft 
Policies CMA MoA Large-
scale 
farmers 
Ministry 
of the 
Interior 
Regional 
Council 
Framework convention in the Souss  X X X  X X 
Mobilisation of new water resources in the 
Souss  
 X X    
Control of borehole drilling in the Souss, Saiss 
and Berrchid areas 
X X (only in 
the Souss) 
 X  
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Considering each study area individually, there is a large coalition in the Souss, although the 
involvement of large-scale farmers is precarious. In the Saiss and Berrchid areas, the CMAs are 
in charge of setting up a large coalition, but are facing difficulties achieving this goal. While in 
the Souss, public institutions see the framework convention as a common construct, in the Saiss 
and Berrchid, the aquifer management contract is seen as a tool initiated and owned by the 
CMAs. In the Coastal Chaouia case, no actor is in charge of building a coalition.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In all the study areas, the CMAs are facing difficulties building coalitions because of the limited 
number of personnel and their lack of appropriate skills. CMA staff are mainly engineers and 
technicians trained in water resource sciences but not in agricultural or social sciences. They 
have limited experience with participatory processes and interactions with farmers. As a result, 
they find it difficult to coordinate multi-stakeholder processes and to deal with agricultural 
issues. In the Souss, the framework convention process slowed down when the coordination 
shifted from the Regional Council - which hired a consultant firm to support the process - to the 
CMA. Apart from this common constraint, the study areas display a wide range of public 
policies and supporting coalitions. Four factors explain this diversity. 
Depth of the aquifer. The depth of the aquifer influences the speed with which the 
groundwater economy follows the pattern from growth to maturation and, in case of 
groundwater overuse, to possible decay (Shah, 2009). Such depth represents the ‘buffering 
capacity’ of the aquifer, i.e. the time available for coalitions to be built and policies to be set up. 
In the Souss, public organisations and farmers have been aware of the groundwater problem for 
at least 30 years, and groundwater is still mostly available, so the actors have had time to find 
solutions to deal with the groundwater crisis. By contrast, in the Berrchid and Chaouia areas, 
which have shallow aquifers, less than 20 years passed between the start of intensive 
groundwater use and the appearance of an acute groundwater crisis: farmers and local public 
institutions have had much less time to acknowledge the importance and fragility of the 
groundwater economy, and to launch discussions over ways to avert the crisis. In that sense, the 
Chaouia and Berrchid cases are close to the ‘exit’ category of aquifers coined by Shah (2009), 
which involves rapid overexploitation of fragile aquifers and farmers hastily moving away from 
the area. The Souss and Saiss regions, in their current situation, correspond more to the 
‘collusive opportunism’ category defined by Shah (2009), with ever decreasing levels of deep 
aquifers that may progressively drive smaller-scale farmers away from irrigated farming. 
Although policies to obtain new water resources and to control groundwater use are 
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implemented or planned in these two regions, they have not yet succeeded in halting the drop in 
the groundwater tables.  
Recognition of irrigated farming as the main cause of a groundwater crisis in the local 
political arena. In the Souss, both farmers and public institutions have long understood the 
impacts of irrigation on the aquifer. As mentioned above, farmers in the coastal Chaouia area 
acknowledge only a limited link between groundwater overuse and seawater intrusion. 
Moreover, in this region many farmers and some staff of the local MoA offices think that one 
major cause of the groundwater crisis is the building of a dam on the Oum Er-Rbia River in the 
1990s, although this river in fact drains water from the aquifer.  
The importance of the groundwater economy in the regional and national economy. The 
attention actors pay to the problem of groundwater overuse is influenced by its relative 
importance compared to non-agricultural activities or to rainfed agriculture. The Souss is a 
much drier area than the Saiss, where many crops can be rainfed. In addition, in the Souss, 
citrus and vegetables for export, which rank first in Morocco, have required major investments, 
and are grown on large-scale farms with strong lobbying capacities vis-à-vis the public 
administration. In comparison, the economic activities generated by the use of the Chaouia and 
Berrchid aquifers are only small components of the economy of the Doukkala Abda and 
Chaouia Ouaragha regions. 
The motivation and capacities of actors to engage in policies for the sustainable use of 
groundwater. The motivation of public organisations to take an active stance in policies dealing 
with groundwater overdraft depends on the importance of the aquifer in the area they manage. 
Addressing the groundwater crisis was at the top of the agenda of both the Souss-Massa 
Regional Council and the CMA. By contrast, the Saiss aquifer is shared between two regions, 
and neither of the Regional Councils took an active stance towards groundwater management. 
Souss farmers are mostly land owners and are strongly integrated in local communities (Faysse 
et al., 2010). By comparison, in the Berrchid region, many farmers rent land, and villages are 
scarce, hence the farmers are much less attached to either the land or the community. In the 
Souss, some farmers’ organisations were sufficiently organised to play an active role in 
negotiations with public organisations. In the Chaouia and Berrchid there are far fewer farmers’ 
organisations and those that exist are much weaker. 
The three last factors are close to those identified by Ostrom (2000) concerning the 
characteristics of appropriators enabling self-management of common-pool natural resources. 
Indeed, among the factors that Ostrom identified: i) the common understanding of the resource 
relates to the second of the four above-mentioned factors; ii) the dependence of appropriators on 
the resource system for a major portion of their livelihood relates to the third one; and iii) the 
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low discount rate for the future and prior organisational experience relate to the fourth. 
However, assessing these factors should not lead to underrating the importance of the 
negotiation processes, with their due share of contingencies and path dependencies. In addition, 
these factors may change over time. Thus, these factors should not be considered as elements 
that could be used to separate situations in which large coalitions may reach sustainable 
groundwater use and others which are doomed to a tragedy of the commons. Rather, they should 
be considered as a guide to identifying which coalitions should be supported, which stumbling 
blocks need to be removed to reach relevant coalitions, and to identify the most appropriate 
policies that these coalitions may be able to design and implement. In the Souss and Saiss 
regions, collaboration with farmers’ organisations could be reinforced, so as to tap the farmers’ 
predisposition for the establishment of regulatory instruments, provided the latter are 
implemented in an equitable way. In the Chaouia and Berrchid regions, CMA staff could be 
specifically mandated to catalyze coalitions and to create a local dynamics to address the 
groundwater crisis. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In the recent past, several policies have been implemented to deal with the increasing 
groundwater crisis in Morocco, both in terms of demand and supply management. Many of 
these policies did not remain ‘on paper’, and, in particular, the activities of the water police have 
already had considerable impacts on the ground. The types of policies implemented differed 
widely between the study areas, mostly because of different supporting coalitions of actors.  
However, despite the administration’s stated objective of building large coalitions, 
existing coalitions are limited both in their number of members and in their objectives. Small-
scale farmers are not included in the already strong coalition between Souss large-scale farmers 
and the MoA for developing new water resources, nor are they part of the increasingly 
influential coalitions involving the CMAs and the Ministry of the Interior for implementing the 
water police. Moreover, groundwater governance has only made limited appearances in local 
public arenas. Aquifers have thus turned into a ‘space of dependence’ but have not yet become a 
‘space of engagement’ (Venot et al., 2011). 
In the future, the CMAs will remain key actors in building large coalitions. However, 
they need to move from a posture of law enforcement, from which they derive their power and 
legitimacy, to one that places much more emphasis on coalition building, and this requires new 
skills. Moreover, as the water police become more present on the ground, the even-handedness 
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with which this police force controls farmers will evolve into an increasingly contested issue. 
Transparent monitoring of its functioning will be increasingly necessary. Finally, innovative 
ways to include small-scale farmers in coalitions should be supported, particularly by engaging 
with the many active farmers’ organisations at local level (Faysse et al., 2010), even though 
these organisations may not be formally involved in water resource management.  
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